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Abstract 
Testing consumer theory: Evidence from a natural field experiment* 
 
We present evidence from a natural field experiment designed to shed light on 
whether individual behavior is consistent with a neoclassical model of utility 
maximization subject to budget constraints. We do this through the lens of a field 
experiment on charitable giving. We find that the behavior of at least 80% of indi-
viduals, on both the extensive and intensive margins, can be rationalized within a 
standard neoclassical choice model in which individuals have preferences, defined 
over own consumption and their contribution towards the charitable good, satis-
fying the axioms of revealed preference. 
 
 
Keywords: natural field experiment, revealed preference. 
 
JEL classification: C93, D01, D12, D64. 
 
 
                                                 
* Acknowledgements: We thank the Editor, Robert Slonim, and one anonymous reviewer 
for helpful comments. We thank Sami Berlinski, Stéphane Bonhomme, Guillermo Caruana, 
Syngjoo Choi, Heike Harmgart, Dean Karlan, Enrico Moretti, Sendhil Mullainathan, Adam 
Rosen, Georg Weizsäcker, and seminar participants at Autonoma, CEMFI, LSE, and the LEaF 
2007 Conference at UCL for useful comments. We gratefully acknowledge financial 
support from the ESRC. All errors remain our own. 
1 Introduction
Neoclassical theory provides a rich set of testable implications for how consumer demand responds
to changes in relative prices and income. This paper presents evidence from the first large-scale
natural field experiment shedding light on whether individual behavior is consistent with the
predictions of revealed preference theory within a standard model of utility maximization subject
to budget constraints [e.g. Afriat 1967]. We do this through the lens of a natural field experiment
on charitable giving.
By focusing our analysis on the choice between a charitable good and private consumption, we
vary the budget set individuals face in a straightforward and natural way, holding all other prices
constant. We do so by offering various matching schemes that affect how donations given for the
charitable good translate into donations received by the project. Specifically, we induce—(i) large
changes in the relative price of the charitable good through rates at which donations are matched;
(ii) pure income transfers to individuals through a matching scheme that guarantees any positive
donation is matched by some fixed amount; (iii) a non-convex budget set in which only donations
above some threshold are matched.
In our design the induced budget sets intersect each other, opening up the possibility to directly
test the predictions of revealed preference theory. For such research questions, a between-subject
research design is strictly preferred to a within-subject design. This is because within-subject
designs inevitably require the same individual to be presented with different budget sets at different
moments in time. This raises the concern that there are natural changes over time in incomes,
relative prices, asset holdings or labor supplies, that confound any inference that can be made on
whether individual preferences satisfy the axioms of revealed preference.
Our main result is that on both the extensive and intensive margins of charitable giving,
individual choices can be rationalized within a standard model of consumers maximizing utility
subject to budget constraints, where individual preferences are defined over own consumption
and charitable donations received by the project. The behavior of at least 80% of recipients who
make some positive contribution is in line with their preferences satisfying GARP. In short, in
a real world environment where participants make simple decisions they are familiar with, the
predictions of microeconomic theory work well in explaining individual behavior.
We highlight that field experiments can be used to test revealed preference theory and such
approaches are complementary to non-experimental tests of consumer theory which typically ex-
ploit panel data on consumer purchases. However, as in within-subject experimental designs, in
non-experimental data apparent violations of revealed preference might instead be due to changes
in tastes, changes in the holding of durables, or the storage of consumables and consumption
expenditures are typically measured with error. Consumer panels also typically suffer from ob-
served price changes being both relatively small, and not necessarily implying an intersection of
budget sets. Hence in contrast to our research design, tests of revealed preference based on non-
experimental data are likely to have low power [Varian 1982, Bronars 1995]. Such approaches,
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have provided mixed results with some studies rejecting behavior consistent with GARP [Mossin
1972, Hardle et al 1991] and others finding more rationalizable patterns of consumption [Manser
and McDonald 1988, Famulari 1995]. Methodological advances using non-parametric techniques
suggest consumer behavior does not reject GARP in the long run for most income groups [Blundell
et al 2003].
Our analysis also builds on laboratory evidence on consumer choice, which has provided mixed
evidence on whether individual behavior is consistent with GARP [Battaglio et al 1973, Cox 1997,
Sippel 1997, Andreoni and Miller 2002, Choi et al 2007, List and Millimet 2008]. Our research
design combines the key advantages of laboratory experiments in being able to experimentally
manipulate the economic environment faced by agents with the advantages of a field study using
real world data on a large population. As suggested by Varian [2006], this research design is
perhaps the best possible that could be used to test whether individual behavior is consistent with
revealed preference theory.1 2
2 The Natural Field Experiment
2.1 Design
In June 2006 the Bavarian State Opera organized a mail out of letters to over 25,000 individuals
designed to elicit donations for a social youth project the opera was engaged in. The project’s
beneficiaries are children from disadvantaged families whose parents are almost surely not among
the recipients of the mail out. As it is not one large event that donations are sought for, but rather
a series of several smaller events, it is clear to potential donors that additional money raised can
fund additional activity. In other words, the marginal contribution will always make a difference
to the project.
Individuals were randomly assigned to one of five treatments that varied in how individual
donations would be matched by an anonymous lead donor. The format and wording of the mail
out is provided in the Appendix. The mail out letters were identical in all treatments with the
exception of one paragraph. Since the presence of a lead donor may serve as a signal of project
quality [Vesterlund 2003, Andreoni 2006], it is essential that the lead donor is also mentioned in a
baseline treatment. Hence in the control treatment T1, recipients were informed that the project
had already garnered a lead gift of e60,000, but there was no offer to match donations. The
wording of the key paragraph read as follows,
1Our results differ from some of the laboratory evidence on consumer choice, such as Battalio et al [1973] and
Sippel [1997] who find behavior not to be in line with GARP. This may be because in our study consumers are
faced with a real life setting and make simple decisions they are familiar with, and we exploit a large sample of
individuals.
2Our analysis here focuses on the broad question of whether individual behavior is consistent with neoclassical
microeconomic theory. In companion papers we exploit the natural field experiment to shed light on specific issues
relating to the economics of charitable giving [Huck and Rasul 2011, and Huck, Rasul, and Shephard 2015].
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T1 (Control): A generous donor who prefers not to be named has already been enlisted. He will
support “Stu¨ck fu¨r Stu¨ck” with e60,000. Unfortunately, this is not enough to fund the project
completely which is why I would be glad if you were to support the project with your donation.
T2 (50% Matching): A generous donor who prefers not to be named has already been enlisted.
He will support “Stu¨ck fu¨r Stu¨ck” with up to e60,000 by donating, for each Euro that we receive
within the next four weeks, another 50 Euro cent. In light of this unique opportunity I would be
glad if you were to support the project with your donation.
T3 (100% Matching): A generous donor who prefers not to be named has already been
enlisted. He will support “Stu¨ck fu¨r Stu¨ck” with up to e60,000 by donating, for each donation that
we receive within the next four weeks, the same amount himself. In light of this unique opportunity
I would be glad if you were to support the project with your donation.
T4 (Non-convex): A generous donor who prefers not to be named has already been enlisted.
He will support “Stu¨ck fu¨r Stu¨ck” with up to e60,000 by donating, for each donation above e50
that we receive within the next four weeks, the same amount himself. In light of this unique
opportunity I would be glad if you were to support the project with your donation.
T5 (Income): A generous donor who prefers not to be named has already been enlisted. He
will support “Stu¨ck fu¨r Stu¨ck” with up to e60,000 by donating, for each donation that we receive
within the next four weeks regardless of the donation amount, another e20. In light of this unique
opportunity I would be glad if you were to support the project with your donation.
Notice how T4 and T5 generate budget constraints that overlap and cross with others thus
generating revealed preference predictions.
2.2 Conceptual Framework
We assume potential donors have preferences defined over two dimensions—their own consumption,
c, and the marginal benefit their donation provide, dr. In our setting we then have two goods—
donations received by the project, and a composite good representing all other consumption. We
denote the price and goods vectors as p and x respectively. As in the exposition of Varian [2006],
we then have the following definitions.
Definition (Revealed Preference) Given some vector of prices and chosen bundles (pt,xt)
for t = 1, ..., T , xt is directly revealed preferred to x if ptxt ≥ ptx. xt is indirectly
revealed preferred to x if there is some sequence r, s, t, ..., u, v such that prxr ≥ prxs,
psxs ≥ psxt, ...,puxu ≥ pux.
Definition (Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference) If xt is directly revealed preferred to xs,
then it is not the case that xs is directly revealed preferred to xt, so that ptxt ≥ ptxs implies
psxs < psxt.
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Definition (Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference) The data (pt,xt) satisfy the Gen-
eralized Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP) if xt is (directly or indirectly) revealed pre-
ferred to xs implies psxs ≤ psxt.
In two dimensions as in our setting, the Weak and Generalized Axioms of Revealed Preference
are equivalent. The main result in the revealed preference literature is from Afriat [1967] which
states that given some choice data (pt,xt) for t = 1, ..., T, the following conditions are equivalent:
(i) the data satisfy GARP; (ii) there exists a non-satiated, continuous, monotone, and concave
utility function, u(x) that rationalizes the data. In our setting, this corresponds to individual
behavior being rationalized by the following utility maximization problem,
max
dr
u(c, dr) subject to c+ dg ≤ y, c, dg ≥ 0, and dr = f(dg), (1)
where u(c, dr) has the properties listed above, the first constraint ensures consumption can be no
greater than income net of any donation given, y−dg, the second constraint requires consumption
and donations given to be non-negative, and the third constraint denotes the matching scheme
that translates donations given into those received by the opera house.
Figure 1 graphs the budget sets induced by the five treatments in (y − dg, dr)-space. As the
budget sets across treatments intersect, pairwise comparisons of the behavior of individuals in any
two treatments allows us to test whether consumer behavior is on average consistent with GARP.
However, although behavior on average might be consistent, each individual’s preferences may
violate GARP. We therefore exploit the random assignment of recipients to treatments to test for
individual violations of GARP.
3 Descriptives
3.1 Treatment Assignment, Extensive and Intensive Margin Outcomes
Table 1 summarizes information on individuals in each treatment and reports the p-values on the
null hypothesis that the mean characteristic of individuals in the treatment group are the same
as in the control group T1. There are no significant differences along any dimension between
recipients in each treatments.
Table 2 provides descriptive evidence on behavior on the intensive and extensive margins of
charitable giving by treatment. For each statistic we report its mean, its standard error in paren-
theses, and whether it is significantly different from that in the control treatment. Figure 1
provides a graphical representation of the outcomes across treatments, showing for each treatment
t the average bundle chosen, xt, at the relevant price vector, pt. In our sample of 18,725 indi-
vidual recipients, Columns 1 to 3 reveal that overall, 780 individuals donated a total of e75,350,
corresponding to e116,489 raised for the project, with a mean donation given of e96.6.
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On the extensive margin of giving, Column 4 shows that response rates vary from 3.5% to
4.7% across treatments, which are almost double those in comparable large-scale natural field
experiments on charitable giving [Eckel and Grossman 2008, Karlan and List 2007]. Indeed, a
rule of thumb used by charitable organizations is to expect response rates to mail solicitations of
between .5% and 2.5% [de Oliveira et al 2011].
On the relative price of giving we note that despite there being large variations in the budget
sets in treatments T1 to T3, there are no statistically significant differences in response rates across
these treatments. On the intensive margin, Column 5 shows that in the control treatment T1,
the average donation given is e132. As the relative price of donations received falls in treatments
T2 and T3, the average donation received increases to e151 in T2 with a 50% match rate, and
to e185 in T3 with a 100% match rate. As shown in Figure 1 and Column 7 of Table 2, as the
match rate increases, the average donation given, dg, falls from e132 in the control treatment T1
to e101 in T2 with a 50% match rate, and to e92.3 in T3 with a 100% match rate.
Treatment T4 induces recipients to face a non-convex budget set. For donations below e50 the
budget line is coincident with that of the control treatment T1, for donations at or above e50 it
coincides with that of the 100% matching treatment T3. Figure 1 shows that average outcome in
terms of donations given and received in T4 replicate almost exactly those in the 100% matching
treatment T3—the average donation received in T4 is e194, as opposed to e185 in T3, and the
average donation given is e97.9, as opposed to e92.3 in T3. To see why this is so, note that in
the control treatment the average donation received is e132. This suggests the portion of the
budget line in T4 that lies to the left of e100 on the x-axis of donations received is irrelevant for
many recipients. In essence, treatments T3 and T4 present the average recipient with an almost
identical choice. Hence, response rates and donations should not differ markedly between the two.
Treatment T5—that causes a parallel shift out of the budget set conditional on any positive
donation, should induce the largest change in the number of donors relative to the control group
because any individual with preferences such that MRSc,dr |dr=0 < 0 will find it optimal to donate
some amount in T5, whereas this is not the case in other treatments. The response rate is
indeed significantly higher in T5 relative to the other treatments. However, it is still only 4.7%,
highlighting that even among this targeted population, 95% of individuals do not care for the
project. Comparing the income treatment T5 to the control treatment, consumer theory suggests
these additional donors should be willing to contribute relatively small amounts to the project
which is strongly supported in the data.
4 Testing Revealed Preference Theory
4.1 Aggregate Violations
As the budget sets in treatments T1 to T5 intersect or overlap as shown in Figure 1, pairwise
comparisons of the average behavior of individuals in any two treatments lead to tests of whether
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behavior is consistent with revealed preference theory. These tests are of three types: (i) the
proportion of recipients that should donate some positive amount; (ii) the proportion of recipients
that lie above or below some critical threshold, which is typically where the two budget lines
intersect.; and, (iii) the distribution of donations given and received.
An example of the first type of test is given by comparing treatments T1 and T3. As shown
in Figure 1, the budget set expands moving from T1 to T3. Assuming individual preferences are
well behaved, the proportion of individuals that find it optimal to provide some positive donation
under T3 should be at least as great as the proportion that respond under T1.
An example of the second type of test is given by comparing treatments T2 and T5 in which
the budget sets cross at donations given equal to e40. For all donations given greater than e40,
the budget set expands under T2 relative to T5. Hence revealed preference arguments imply the
proportion of donations given that are at least e40 should be weakly higher in T2 than T5.
An example of the third type of test is given by comparing treatments T3 and T4. As shown
in Figure 1, the budget sets are coincident for donations given that are more than e50. Hence the
distribution of donations given conditional on them being more than e50, should be identical in
both treatments. This follows from the fact that any donors that contribute strictly more than
e50 under T3 should, by revealed preference, also contribute the same under T4.
Table 3 presents the results for each pairwise treatment comparison. Columns (1)-(3) give the
hypotheses to be tested of the type: ”the behavior is consistent with revealed preferences.” One
test is boxed as it requires the additional assumption of strict convexity in addition to satisfy-
ing GARP. For each test, we report the p-value on the null hypothesis consistent with revealed
preference theory. Thirteen of the fourteen tests do not reject the hypothesis that consumers, on
average, having an underlying utility function that displays standard properties.
The exception is the test between T3 and T4 in the last column that is based on the assumption
of convexity. To examine this violation in more detail, we note that if preferences are convex, then
by revealed preference, individuals who would have donated less than e50 in T3 are expected to
donate no more than e50 in T4. Hence relative to T3, there ought to be relatively more donations
given below or at dg = e50 in T4. In the data there is, however, a bunching of donations in
T4 relative to T3 slightly above dg = e50, and a fall in the proportion of donations given below
e50, that is, we find that donors prefer to give incrementally above e50 when faced with the
non-convex budget set (perhaps in order to avoid the appearance of being “cheap”).
4.2 Individual Violations
In our between-subject design we do not observe the same consumer making multiple choices under
alternative budget sets. To detect individual violations of GARP we propose a novel approach
based on the estimate for each individual i, whose actual choice we only observe in treatment t,
for what she would have donated in the relevant counterfactual treatment t′ 6= t based on the
predictions from a hurdle model. This takes explicit account of the fact that the initial decision
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to donate (Di = 0 or 1) may be separated from the decision of how much to donate: the choice of
dr conditional on Di = 1. A simple two-tiered model for charitable giving has, as a first stage, a
probit model of giving. At the second stage, we assume donations received from individual i are
log normally distributed conditional on dri > 0. The maximum likelihood estimator of the second
stage parameters is then simply the OLS estimator from the following regression,
log(dri) = βTi + γXi + zi for dri > 0, (2)
where Ti is a dummy for any treatment Ti that the individual was assigned to (T2-T5). We estimate
the coefficients relative to a control treatment for each treatment separately.3 We also control for
the following individual characteristics Xi, to reduce the sampling errors of the treatment effect
estimates: whether recipient i is female, the number of ticket orders placed in the 12 months prior
to mail out, the average price of these tickets, whether i resides in Munich, and a dummy for
whether the year of the last ticket purchase was 2006. We calculate robust standard errors. More
details of the procedure are provided in the Technical Appendix.
In a second step, for each individual and treatment that this individual was not in, we predict
her donation amount based on her individual characteristics, fictive treatment assignment and the
coefficient estimates from the first stage. We use this comparison between one actual treatment
t and one predicted counterfactual treatment t′ as the basis of tests for individual violations of
revealed preference theory.4 There are 10 such pairwise comparisons, as Table 4 shows. These are
analogous to a subset of the tests performed in Table 3, namely those for which the budget sets
intersect. Column 1 shows the number of violations of revealed preference theory for each pairwise
comparison of treatments. We also show the proportion of violations defined as the number of
violations divided by the number of positive actual donations that fulfill the first part of the
condition.5 Both measures have been previously used in the literature as measures of goodness of
fit in tests of revealed preference [Gross 1995].
Across pairwise comparisons, the proportion of violations varies. To provide a sense of the
magnitude of such violations, Column 2 shows the average donation given among violators of
GARP and a 95% confidence interval. The first row shows that individuals that violate GARP
and donate less than e50 in T4, on average, actually donate e49.5. Hence there are a small number
of violations of this prediction of revealed preference theory, and the magnitude of the violations
is small. In contrast, the fifth row shows that individuals that violate GARP and donate more
than e40 in T5, on average, actually donate e68. Hence for this test, there are both a relatively
large number of violations, and violations are quantitatively large.
For comparisons involving the income treatment T5, Column 3 restricts the sample to high
valuation recipients who, based on their predicted donation from (2), would likely donate more
3The omitted treatment is T1 for T2–T5 and a treatment T0 without a lead donor for T1.
4We do not compare predicted choices with each other.
5Notice that an alternative would be to take the entire sample as a denominator (for example, people who always
give zero are always consistent). Our more conservative approach adjusts for cases of low power.
8
than e20 even absent any match, to avoid confounding the comparisons with a change in the
identity of the marginal donor. For these donors the treatment corresponds to a de facto increase
in income rather than a conditional increase in income as they would have donated some positive
amount in any case. When focusing on high valuation donors, the number of violations falls
considerably. This highlights that some of the earlier violations are likely driven by changes in the
composition of donors across treatments. In particular there are likely to be low valuation donors
that give positive amounts in the income treatment T5 but that would not have donated in any
other counterfactual treatment.
To summarize, the behavior of 88 individuals is predicted to violate revealed preferences (out of
466),6 while at least 80% of recipients’ behavior is consistent with GARP. Whether this is a large
or small number depends on the power of our tests, which in turn requires a specific alternative
hypothesis to be specified [Varian 1982, Bronars 1995]. On the one hand, in contrast to non-
experimental methods, our field experiment allows us to engineer large changes in relative prices
holding everything else equal. This improves the power of our test. On the other hand, the bundle
at which the budget sets intersect in any two treatments in our design is distant from the bundle
chosen on average in the treatments, thus lowering the power of our test. The extent to which
these factors offset one another varies across each of the pairwise comparisons in Table 4.
To provide a sense of which of the pairwise comparisons are most informative, we consider the
following alternative hypothesis. We generate predicted choices for each donor by first estimating a
specification analogous to (2) but excluding the treatment dummy. Column 4 of Table 4 then shows
the number and percentage of violations of GARP that would have occurred under this alternative
hypothesis. For eight out of the ten pairwise comparisons the number of actual violations is equal
or smaller than the number of violations based on this alternative, in some cases by orders of
magnitudes, suggesting these pairwise comparisons are powerful tests of GARP. More details of
this test are provided in the Technical Appendix.
5 Conclusions
We have presented evidence from the first large-scale natural field experiment designed to shed light
on whether consumer behavior is consistent with the predictions of revealed preference theory. We
do so in the context of a field experiment on charitable giving which allows us to vary budget sets
experimentally in a straightforward and very natural manner. We find that consumer behavior, on
both the extensive and intensive margins of charitable giving, can be rationalized within a standard
model of consumer choice in which individuals have preferences over their own consumption and
their contribution towards the charitable project. The behavior of at least 80% of recipients is in
line with them adhering to GARP. In short, in a real world static environment where participants
make simple decisions they are familiar with, the predictions of microeconomic theory work well
6Note that some conditions overlap.
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in explaining the observed choices of individuals.
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Abstract
This appendix contains some additional details of the analysis presented in section 4.2 in
the main paper and an additional robustness test. It also includes the mail out letter and its
translation.
1
1 The Prediction Model
It is important to be clear that by using a between-subject design and therefore having to predict
recipient behavior to treatments they were not assigned to, the test of GARP partly relies on the
accuracy of the prediction model. Table T1 presents the estimates from model (2) that form base
for our predictions. Note that the regressions are run pairwise, relative to the control treatment.
Out of six regressions only one of the treatment coefficients (on T4) is not significant but it is, at
the same time, very small compared to the others.
The potential inaccuracy of the prediction model raises a number of issues. First, it would
always be preferable to control for a rich a set of covariates as possible. In this setting, we are
restricted to those observables available from the opera house’s database that relate to proxies of
individual affinity to the opera house and income. Future field experiments should engage in more
primary data collection to help address this issue.
Second, the prediction has some associated standard error. Hence although the point estimate
of the prediction may suggest a lack of violation of GARP, or vice versa, this might not be a
particularly informative statement. To see the precision of the prediction, Column 2 also gives the
95% confidence interval for predicted donations among violators of GARP. For example, for the
third test based on a comparison of actual behavior in T2 and predicted behavior in T4, the point
estimate on the prediction of violators is e48.2 and the 95% confidence interval is from e38.4 to
e58. As the confidence interval runs above e50, it might be that all violators actually adhere
to GARP. Of course the prediction error also implies that some individuals assigned to adhere
to GARP according to their point estimate, might not actually do so at conventional significance
levels. In this regard, it is probably helpful to focus on the behavior of a relatively homogeneous
group: a specifically targeted group of opera goers, and among this group, those that actually
choose to make some positive donation.
Third, the prediction model might be misspecified. As a robustness check, we note that allowing
for heterogenous treatment effects in each treatment, so that the predicted donation is based on a
regression in which each characteristic is also interacted with the relevant treatment dummy, yields
similar conclusions. Clearly, more sophisticated approaches could be applied to make predictions
that are more robust to functional form misspecifications such as the non-parametric methods
developed in Blundell et al [2003, 2007].
2 Power
The second set of issues to be discussed with this methodology is in regard to the power of the
test. Whether 80% of non-violations of GARP is considered a large or small number depends
on the power of our tests, which in turn requires a specific alternative hypothesis to be specified
[Varian 1982, Bronars 1995, Andreoni and Harbaugh 2008]. On the one hand, in contrast to
non-experimental methods, our field experiment allows us to engineer large changes in relative
2
prices holding everything else equal. This improves the power of our test. In addition we note
that the observables controlled for do have some predictive power in explaining the variation in
donations. More precisely we find that in general, recipients that have placed more ticket orders in
the 12 months prior to the mail out, and have paid a higher average price per ticket over the same
period, donate significantly more regardless of whichever treatment they are assigned to. Hence
the observables we condition explain some of the variation in donations, increasing the power of
our test to detect violations of revealed preference theory, all else equal.
On the other hand, the bundle at which the budget sets intersect in any two treatments in our
design is distant from the bundle chosen on average in the treatments, thus lowering the power of
our test. The extent to which these factors offset one another varies across each of the pairwise
comparisons in Table 4, but this is a shortcoming of our design that should be borne in mind for
the results. This does not however detract from the methodological contribution of our analysis
that field experiments can be crafted to test revealed preference theory.1
To provide a sense of which of the pairwise comparisons therefore are most informative, we
consider the following alternative hypothesis. We generate predicted choices of each donor by
first estimating a specification analogous to (2) but not controlling for any treatment dummy,
including the omitted control treatment T1. The results are provided in Table T2. Hence under
this alternative we assume donations are driven purely by the observables listed in Table 1 rather
than treatment assignment. Column 4 of Table 4 then shows the number and percentage of
violations of GARP that would have occurred under this particular alternative hypothesis.
For eight out of the ten pairwise comparisons—except row 5 and 9—the number of violations
based on this alternative are always at least as large as the actual number of violations. Note
that if the number (percentage) of violations based on the alternative is small, there is not much
room for improvement—like in row 10. In some cases, the number of actual violations is orders of
magnitude smaller than would be expected from this alternative hypothesis, suggesting these pair-
wise comparisons are powerful tests of GARP. For example, in the comparison between observed
donations in T4 and predicted donations in T2, the actual number of violations is 14 while 35
violations are predicted under the alternative hypothesis. Similarly, comparing observed donations
in T5 and predicted donations in T2, the actual number of violations is 0 while 7 violations are
predicted under the alternative hypothesis.
In contrast, a few of the other comparisons distinctly lack power against this specific alterna-
tive, which is as expected given the shortcomings arising from the precise location of intersection
between budget sets described above. For example, the comparison of actual behavior in T5 to
predicted behavior in T3 yields zero violations of GARP under both our test and this alternative
hypothesis, so this particular comparison is not informative of whether individual behavior can
be rationalized by GARP in this setting. These findings highlight that although the methodolog-
ical approach of using a field experiment to test for GARP has many advantages over laboratory
1A series of indices of power of GARP tests are presented in Andreoni and Harbaugh [2008].
3
or non-experimental approaches, the mere fact that large price changes can be induced is not
sufficient to guarantee that tests of GARP have high power against an alternative hypothesis.
Although both methodological issues—the accuracy of the prediction model and power of the
GARP test—apply to all empirical approaches, solutions to both might more readily available to
field experimenters. In future work using this approach, experimenters need to engage in data
collection and design interventions that improve the accuracy and robustness of the prediction
model, and allow for more powerful tests of GARP by engineering budget line intersections at
bundles closer to the expected behavior of more individuals.
3 Focal Point Effects?
The results in Table 4 highlight that the pairwise comparisons that yield the highest percentage
of violations all involve the non-convex treatment T4. As discussed earlier, this might be because
individuals that would have given less than e50 in T1 choose to donate slightly more than revealed
preference theory predicts in T4 and so do locate just above the interior corner solution of e50
in T4. Moreover, the wording in T4 in the mail out letter might lead to dg = e50 becoming
focal for recipients. If so, then relative to T3 there ought to be bunching in the distribution of
donations given from above at dg = e50 in T4. No such bunching above dg = e50 is predicted in
the standard model of consumer choice—this segment of the budget line is available under both
T3 and T4.
To explore we use quantile regression methods to characterize the effect of being assigned to
treatment T4 relative to T3 on different percentiles of the conditional distribution of donations
given, dg. This allows us to estimate changes in the shape and spread of the conditional distribution
of donations given, not just the change in the mean as estimated in (2). We therefore estimate
the following quantile regression specification at each quantile θ ∈ [0, 1],
Quantθ(log(dgi)|.) = βθT4i + γθXi for dgi > 0. (1)
The parameter of interest, βθ, measures the difference at the θth conditional quantile of log
donations received between the treatment group T4 relative to the omitted group T3. Figure 2B
graphs estimates of βθ from (1) and the associated 95% confidence interval at each quantile. We
also show the quantile that corresponds to donations given of e50 (e60) across T3 and T4.
Figure T2 shows the distribution of donations given becomes less dispersed in T4 and in
particular, this is because there is a bunching of donations given just above e50 in T4 relative to
T3. The estimates show that there are recipients that would otherwise have given less than e50
in T3 are those that shift their donations towards e50 and slightly above. There is no evidence
that recipients who would have otherwise given above e50 significantly reduced their donations
towards e50 in T4. Indeed, the distribution of donation given is little changed above e70 in line
4
with there being no or very weak focal point effects introduced by the non-convex treatment.2
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Appendix: The Mail Out Letter (Translated) 
 
Bayerische Staatsoper 
Staatsintendant 
Max-Joseph-Platz 2, D-80539 München 
www.staatsoper.de 
 
[ADDRESS OF RECIPIENT] 
 
Dear [RECIPIENT], 
 
The Bavarian State Opera House has been investing in the musical education of 
children and youths for several years now as the operatic the art form is in increasing 
danger of disappearing from the cultural memory of future generations. 
 
Enthusiasm for music and opera is awakened in many different ways in our children 
and youth programme, “Erlebnis Oper” [Experience Opera]. In the forthcoming 
season 2006/7 we will enlarge the scope of this programme through a new project 
“Stück für Stück” that specifically invites children from schools in socially 
disadvantaged areas to a playful introduction into the world of opera. Since we have 
extremely limited own funds for this project, the school children will only be able to 
experience the value of opera with the help of private donations. 
 
[This paragraph describes each matching scheme and is experimentally varied as 
described in the main text of the paper]. 
 
As a thank you we will give away a pair of opera tickets for Engelbert Humperdinck’s 
“Konigskinder” on Wednesday, 12 July 2006 in the music director’s box as well as 
fifty CDs signed by Maestro Zubin Mehta among all donors. 
 
You can find all further information in the enclosed material. In case of any questions 
please give our Development team a ring on [phone number]. I would be very pleased 
if we could enable the project “Stück für Stück” through this appeal and, thus, make 
sure that the operatic experience is preserved for younger generations. 
 
With many thanks for your support and best wishes, 
 
 
Sir Peter Jonas, Staatsintendant 
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Appendix: The Mail Out Letter (Translated) 
 
“Stück für Stück” 
 
The project “Stück für Stück” has been developed specifically for school children 
from socially disadvantaged areas. Musical education serves many different functions 
in particular for children and youths with difficult backgrounds -- it strengthens social 
competence and own personality, improves children’s willingness to perform, and 
reduces social inequality. Since music education plays a lesser and lesser role in home 
and school education, the Bavarian State Opera has taken it on to contribute to it 
ourselves. The world of opera as a place of fascination is made attainable and 
accessible for young people. 
 
In drama and music workshops, “Stück für Stück” will give insights into the world of 
opera for groups of around 30 children. They will be intensively and creatively 
prepared for a subsequent visit of an opera performance. These workshops encourage 
sensual perception – through ear and eye but also through scenic and physical play 
and intellectual comprehension – all of these are important elements for the 
workshops. How does Orpheus in “Orphee and Eurydice” manage to persuade the 
gods to let him save his wife from the realm of dead? Why does he fail? Why poses 
the opera “Cosi fan tutte” that girls can never be faithful? It is questions like these that 
are investigated on the workshops. 
 
The workshops are also made special through the large number and variety of people 
who are involved in them: musicians, singers, directors, and people from many other 
departments, ranging from costumes and makeup to marketing. The participants in 
each workshop work through an opera’s storyline, and are introduced to the 
production and will meet singers in their costumes as well as musicians. This makes 
the workshops authentic. After the workshops the participants are invited to see the 
actual opera production. 
 
Through your donation the project “Stück für Stück” will be made financially 
viable so that we can charge only a small symbolic fee to the participants. This makes 
it possible to offer our children and youth programme also to children from socially 
disadvantaged backgrounds that can, thus, learn about the fascination of opera. 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: In German, Stück für Stück is a wordplay --- “Stück” meaning “play” as in 
drama and “Stück für Stück” being an expression for doing something bit by bit. 
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Table T1: Estimates of the Model (2) 
 
Dependent variable: Donation given
(a)
  
Baseline T0 T1 T1 T1 T1 T1 
Treatment T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T5 high 
donors 
Treatment dummy 0.366
***
 -0.308
**
 -0.323
***
 -0.054 -0.505
***
 -0.324
***
 
(0.122) (0.134) (0.120) (0.107) (0.117) (0.104) 
Female dummy 0.066 -0.203 0.111 -0.046 -0.032 0.094 
 (0.124) (0.131) (0.120) (0.107) (0.113) (0.103) 
Number of ticket orders in last 12 
months 
0.028
**
 0.037
***
 0.028
**
 0.014 0.028
**
 0.030
**
 
(0.013) (0.014) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013) 
Average value of tickets  0.007
***
 0.009
***
 0.008
***
 0.007
***
 0.008
***
 0.007
***
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Munich postcode (yes=1) 0.102 0.192 0.161 0.143 0.206
*
 0.200
*
 
(0.136) (0.132) (0.122) (0.106) (0.117) (0.107) 
Dummy=1 if year of last ticket 
purchase=2006, =0 if earlier 
0.117 0.219 0.027 0.128 0.231
*
 0.044 
(0.146) (0.153) (0.146) (0.129) (0.130) (0.116) 
Constant 2.987
***
 3.143
***
 3.288
***
 3.518
***
 3.219
***
 3.593
***
 
 (0.220) (0.253) (0.209) (0.222) (0.228) (0.201) 
Observations 274 288 287 292 309 251 
Adjusted R
2
 0.103 0.114 0.158 0.077 0.149 0.131 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01, (a) the dependent variable is 
transformed as follows: f(X)=ln(X-k), with k chosen such that the distribution is symmetric around the mean. 
 
 
Table T2: Estimates of the Model (2) without treatment dummies 
 
Dependent variable: Donation given
(a)
  
Baseline T0 T1 T1 T1 T1 
Treatment T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 
Female dummy 0.115 -0.182 0.143 -0.047 -0.004 
(0.126) (0.131) (0.120) (0.107) (0.116) 
Number of ticket orders in last 12 
months 
0.032** 0.039*** 0.031*** 0.015 0.032** 
(0.013) (0.014) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) 
Average value of tickets  0.007*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.007*** 0.009*** 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Munich postcode (yes=1) 0.094 0.197 0.149 0.137 0.159 
 (0.139) (0.133) (0.123) (0.105) (0.120) 
Dummy=1 if year of last ticket 
purchase=2006, =0 if earlier 
0.134 0.249 0.020 0.129 0.275** 
(0.147) (0.151) (0.145) (0.129) (0.132) 
Constant 3.102*** 2.921*** 3.094*** 3.487*** 2.858*** 
 (0.222) (0.218) (0.199) (0.208) (0.209) 
Observations 274 288 287 292 309 
Adjusted R2 0.075 0.099 0.139 0.080 0.096 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01, (a) the dependent variable is 
transformed as follows: f(X)=ln(X-k), with k chosen such that the distribution is symmetric around the mean. 
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Figure T1: Non Convex Budget Set T4 Relative to 100% Match Rate 
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OLS Estimate 
Notes: The figure shows the estimated effect of being assigned to the non-convex treatment T4 relative to being assigned to the 100% matching 
treatment T3 on the log of donations given, at each quantile of the conditional distribution of the log of donations given, and the associated 95% 
confidence interval. The figure also shows the coefficient on the treatment dummy variable from an OLS regression. The individual characteristics 
controlled for are whether the recipient is female, the number of ticket orders placed in the 12 months prior to mail out, the average price of these 
tickets, whether the recipient is a Munich resident, and a dummy variable for whether the year of the last ticket purchase was 2006 or not. 
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